The judgment in the English Court of Appeal case of Re A (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) highlights forcefully the highly individualistic and abstract assumptions that commonly shape the deployment of rights discourse in liberal legal adjudication. Forced by the all-or-nothing nature of this discourse into a dilemma between perceiving of the twins as separate right-bearers or perceiving of the stronger twin, Jodie, as the singular right-bearer and of Mary, her weaker sibling, as a non-legal entity, the court chose the former option.
INTRODUCTION
Despite the increasing centrality afforded to rights analysis within western liberal legal jurisdictions, considerable scepticism remains regarding the presumptions of individualism and abstraction that underlie this dominant legal strategy. This article re-examines the legitimacy of that scepticism in light of the application of rights discourse in the English Court of Appeal case of Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) .
The ability of rights discourse and analysis to politicize contentious issues and to provide protection to the individual against state intervention has been illustrated repeatedly in liberal legal history and can barely be disputed. The discriminatory application of the averred hallmarks of the liberal system, namely tolerance and equality, has frequently been uncovered and remedied through the invocation of rights-based strategies. Such strategies were central to the historical successes enjoyed by the Black civil rights movement and the Suffragette movement, and they continue to be a crucial aspect of the legal armoury of contemporary political lobbyists.
However, many critical commentators (for example Rhode, 1986 and Kingdom, 1995) have voiced significant concerns regarding the extent to which the liberal tendency to uncritically assume the applicability of dominant rights analysis in all contexts represents a dangerous conceptual move. While acknowledging the merits of rights discourse as a tool of political dialogue, such commentators emphasize the need to maintain a critical awareness of the biases inherent in the ascription of rights and in the determination of rights-based claims (Minow, 1987) .
Inherent in prevailing rights analysis (Rawls, 1993) is an emphasis upon the necessarily individual nature of the rights-bearer, and upon the relevance of rights as a mechanism for providing boundaries between one's interests and those of another. For many critical theorists, however, the individualism and abstraction thus manifest in the dominant liberal notion of rights is problematic, fostering a drive towards separation and radically dislocated autonomy which denies the complexities of human relationships and identity formation (MacKenzie and Stoljar, 2000) . Central to this drive towards individualism and abstraction is an implicit understanding of the legal person as a distinct and separate body with ascertainable boundaries and bodily confines (Nedelsky, 1989) .
Building upon that assertion, this article will illustrate the profound incompatibility of such analysis with those contexts in which the realities of embodiment render the achievement of the radical autonomy assumed by liberal rights at best artificial and at worst unattainable. In particular, this article will examine the legitimacy of these assumptions in the context of conjoined twins, where the physical connection involved graphically undermines the persuasiveness of legal strategies premised upon the delineation of relevant boundaries between one rights-bearer and another.
In highlighting the tension inherent in the application of the abstract and individualist assumptions of rights discourse to the specific context of conjoined twins, this article will also examine the failure of the dominant deontological approach to fulfil its averred role of protecting designated legal persons against utilitarian impulses. The ideological and rhetorical strength of rights-based analysis lies in its ability to privilege the interests of the individual over impinging dictates of the common good. Nonetheless, in contexts where the subjects involved defy conventional separation, this ability is compromised and this rhetoric is betrayed. Most observably in the case of conjoined twins, it will be argued that prevailing analysis is ill-equipped to resolve the stalemate encouraged by the inherently conflictual operation of competing rights claims without the invocation of a utilitarian resolution.
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Having illustrated the potential shortcomings of the application of these characteristic aspects of rights analysis in this specific context, this article will develop alternative legal strategies. In the final section it will examine the implications of incorporation of 'relational rights' in contexts within which the identification of abstract and disinterested individual legal subjects is not always possible, nor profitable. While continuing to protect the individual against the utilitarian impulse, these relational rights permit serious accreditation to the relevance of context, connection and embodiment, thereby enabling a more experientially representative legal depiction than that offered by prevailing rights discourse.
RIGHTS AND WRONG ASSUMPTIONS
Legal libraries abound with literature criticizing as well as applauding rights analysis. While celebrating the dominance of rights-based claims within western legal culture, Glendon, for example, concedes that these rights are often inappropriately conceived as being necessarily property based, autonomous, and protective, rather than potentially also contingent, interconnected and dependent:
Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead towards consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground . . . In its relentless individualism, it fosters a climate that is inhospitable to society's losers, and that systematically disadvantages caretakers and dependants. (1991: 14) Many other critical theorists have likewise drawn attention to similar concerns regarding the abstraction and individualism inherent in prevailing rights-based strategies and discourse. CLS scholar, Mark Tushnet (1984) , for example, has challenged the ability of rights-based strategies to meaningfully resolve complex social dilemmas without simply restating the dilemma involved in more abstract and superficially conclusory form. Likewise, Deborah Rhode (1986) has highlighted a problematic tendency within rights discourse to abstract the parties involved from their personal value choices thereby obscuring the manner in which competing interests are accommodated and adjudicated upon.
Masking preferences under the abstracted rhetoric of rights allows decision-makers to present conclusions in a superficially convincing form. However, the questionable nature of the assumptions behind that conclusion can be forcefully drawn to light through an examination of the legitimacy of the abstractions involved and their correlation to the realities of the specific context at issue. Rothman's commentary (1986) on the development of reproductive rights, for example, provides a vivid illustration of the questionable legitimacy of the motivational factors behind an affirmative claim to rights, which are deemed irrelevant in the abstraction process of prevailing legal discourse. While recognizing that the individual's right to autonomy and family life must be defended as an intrinsically valuable ethical imperative, Rothman also recognizes the failure of prevailing rights analysis to question the legitimacy of those rights against a cultural backdrop that privileges women in the role of mother and caregiver.
Related to this concern regarding the abstraction inherent in prevailing rights analysis, many commentators have challenged the individualist premises implicit in rights discourse and have challenged the necessarily restricted scope this offers for meaningful resolution of contentious questions (Olsen, 1984) . By attaching rights firmly to identifiable individuals, rights-based strategies have fostered a strongly separatist agenda that fails to deal adequately with the complexities of connections and relationships between individuals (Rhode, 1986) . This separatist agenda assumes the existence of differentiated radically autonomous legal agents with self-centred interests located firmly within the confines of self-referring and selfcontained bodily boundaries. In thus privileging unquestioningly the model of the individual rights-bearer, dominant liberal theories have failed to consider the possibility that the self as a rights-bearer and legal person has been profoundly influenced by and cannot be distinguished from both social context and personal relationships (Sandel, 1982) .
The preoccupation fostered by rights analysis with individual entitlements not only diverts concern away from collective responsibilities, but also encourages the adoption of a conflict-dominated perception of social interaction. Where the rhetoric of rights encourages a legal environment dominated by demands for individual entitlement, it also engenders an adjudicative function concerned primarily with evaluating competing claims rather than with meaningfully resolving complex dilemmas (often presented under rights analysis as irreconcilable conflicts). As Jo Bridgeman and Susan Millns comment: rights discourse is inherently individualistic. The presentation of rights as possessed by individuals forces those individuals into an adversarial process in which one right is pitted in opposition to another in order to determine which presents the strongest claim. (1998: 33) In light of these powerful criticisms, it becomes increasingly apparent that the prevailing rights analysis exhibits considerably problematic tendencies towards abstraction and individualism, which prioritize an agenda of separation and conflict over an agenda of connection and co-operation. Nonetheless, critical theorists have often conceded that there remain certain contexts within which the very assumption of individualism and abstraction inherent in prevailing rights discourse may prove empowering to the rights-bearers involved. 1 Elizabeth Kingdom (1995) , for example, despite her vociferous condemnation of aspects of rights analysis, recognizes that adoption of the dominant approach may still be appropriate and beneficial in certain contexts. In particular, she recognizes that in some circumstances, the limitations inherent in
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SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 10(4) the abstraction and individualism of dominant rights discourse may be less important than its political effectiveness. This pragmatic sentiment has been reiterated in the work of Beveridge and Mullaly on rights in the international context. Beveridge and Mullaly (1995) confirm that it may be helpful in certain contexts to employ prevailing rights analysis for strategic reasons, precisely because its bluntness as an instrument enables a reduction of complex issues to a simplified form.
It is difficult to state in advance the contexts within which adoption of the prevailing individualist approach to rights analysis may continue to prove more empowering than the adoption of an approach that emphasizes connection and context. Robin West's (1988) celebrated thesis on the potential within the pregnancy experience for diametrically opposed responses and perceptions illustrates clearly the difficulties involved in seeking to determine an essentialized account of specific forms of inter-personal interaction. It would be impossible, therefore, to determine in advance those contexts within which the individualist approach to rights analysis represents a more or less experientially appropriate analysis without thereby frustrating the benefit of contextual sensitivity that is central to the development of a less abstract alternative rights discourse.
Nonetheless, it is evident that there are many instances within which the abstraction and individualism inherent in prevailing rights analysis is neither empowering nor representative for the legal agents involved. While joining with Kingdom, Beveridge and Mullaly in not seeking to abandon the notion of rights analysis altogether, therefore, this article remains sceptical of the merits of prevailing rights analysis in the myriad social contexts where such abstraction and radical individualism are not the only experientially possible outcomes. The rhetorical value of rights discourse must not be underestimated. However, the unquestioning assumption employed by the courts that the attribution of individualistic rights represents the most fulfilling way to deal with all complex issues arising within a liberal framework remains highly problematic. In particular, we must question the legitimacy of such attribution in cases where the nature of the relationships and context involved strongly contraindicates the exclusive legitimacy of such radical individualism and conflict. As Beveridge and Mulally comment: some conflicts either because of the nature of the relationships involved, or because of the nature of the subject matter, cannot be reduced satisfactorily to the paradigmatic paired oppositions of free-willed self-interested individuals of rights discourse. (1995: 247)
RIGHTS DISCOURSE AND THE SEPARATION THESIS
Robin West's examination of the pregnancy experience highlighted forcefully the possibility of identifying two mutually opposed understandings within the narratives of the expectant mother, one of which valued the intimacy associated with the connection between woman and foetus, the other of MUNRO: CONJOINED TWINS AND RIGHTS 463 which dreaded this intimacy and privileged separation. Developing further this distinction between the 'separation' and 'connection' theses, it becomes evident that current forms of rights analysis represent and articulate the separation side of this dichotomy at the expense of its antithesis. This article will examine the implications of that privileging of separation over connection, through an analysis of specific contexts, particularly that of conjoined twins, within which the likelihood of experiencing requisite abstraction and separation is observably, although not entirely, undermined. Problems pertaining to the individualism and abstraction inherent in rights analysis can be located in a variety of social circumstances. The employment of rights analysis in the general healthcare arena has, for example, provoked considerable concern in terms of its rationing implications and its tendency to facilitate confrontation rather than co-operation between doctors and patients (Newdick, 1995) . Nonetheless, the context of conjoined twins, in exemplifying an instance within which the biological imperatives involved dictate the difficulties of identifying bodily confines, provides a particularly vivid illustration of the contradictory impulses embodied in the rhetoric of rights.
Over the following sections, I will develop in more detail the potentially lamentable consequences of the privileging of separation, abstraction and individualism in dominant rights analysis. In particular, I will examine the extent to which this privileging of the separation thesis undermines the significance of factors, such as relationship, community and connection, which are often central to the determination of meaning and value. In addition, I will illustrate the extent to which, despite maintaining a rhetoric in support of the assumptions of abstraction and individualism characteristic of dominant rights discourse, courts adjudicating in such arenas often encounter difficulties in maintaining this professed deontological approach in the face of a more utilitarian ethic.
THE CONJOINED TWINS
The case of Re A (Children) involved the fate of conjoined twins, referred to as Jodie and Mary, and excited a storm of public interest and medico-legal debate. 2 Born on 8 August 2000, the unique fact about Jodie and Mary's conjoinment was that they shared a common aorta. Despite the fact that Mary's heart and lungs had no capacity for independent life, this enabled Jodie's heart to pump the blood she oxygenated through Mary's body in order to keep both twins alive. However, doing the work for both of them in this way placed considerable strain on Jodie's heart. Medical evidence submitted to the court suggested that if no operation were carried out to separate the twins, Jodie would be extremely likely to suffer fatal cardiac arrest within three to six months. This would inevitably result in both their deaths. In presenting a verdict in favour of performing an operation to separate them, despite its inevitably causing the death of the weaker twin, the three-judge 464
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panel contraindicated not only the wishes of the parents involved, but also the moral doctrines of the Catholic church, the ethical doctrines of pro-life campaigners and the legal doctrines of certain well-established authorities. 3 The deliberation of the Court of Appeal in the case of Jodie and Mary clearly bore the influence of an ideology of rights analysis. While only rarely willing to talk explicitly in terms of competing rights to life, the judges nonetheless freely engaged in an analysis that perpetuated the assumptions of abstraction, individualism and conflict typically characteristic of rights discourse. This was evidenced both in regard to the preliminary matter of whether the operation to separate the twins would be in their best interests despite the inevitable death of the weaker twin, and also in regard to the legality of that active intervention resulting in death. While an evaluation of the legitimacy of the court's reasoning at each stage of this analysis is both important and necessary, it remains outwith the scope of the current project. In the following discussion, I will be concerned more generally with what can be established from this case regarding the legitimacy of these abstract and individualistic assumptions characteristic of prevailing rights discourse.
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND PERCEPTIONS OF CONFLICT
It is interesting to note the ease with which all three judges unquestionably accredited full personhood status to each of the twins as individuals. In the face of doubt regarding her ability to feel pain or to exhibit self-awareness, and despite medical evidence indicating that had she formed as a separate twin she would almost certainly have been still-born, the court was committed to according Mary, the weaker twin, full legal status. While a decision to the contrary would have permitted a more simplistic assessment of the legitimacy of the operation on the basis of the best interests of the stronger twin, Jodie, the panel unanimously considered such arguments counterintuitive and ethically ill-advised. 4 Despite the existence of strong support to the contrary within the works of certain respected ethicists (most notably perhaps John Harris, 2001) , the court's position in this regard may be seen to have accorded with the moral opinion and instincts of the majority. However, it will be argued in this article that the court's uncritical transition from the attribution to both twins of legal status and personhood to the implicit attribution of competing and self-centred rights was considerably less welcome.
In an article illustrating considerable foresight of ensuing legal complexities, 5 Sheldon and Wilkinson noted that: one reason why the issues raised by cases of conjoined twins appear so intractable is that law and ethics have developed along a model of physically separate, individual human beings with competing needs and interests and it is the individual which often provides our basic unit in considering the ethical and legal rights and wrongs. (1997: 151) MUNRO: CONJOINED TWINS AND RIGHTS 465
The attribution of such individually enforceable rights to each of the twins independently of the other, provides for inevitable conflict between the two. Many of the critical commentators discussed above have raised concerns regarding the ability of this conflict model to accommodate various relational aspects of social living. In contexts, such as that of conjoined twins, where there is a clear physical as well as relational bond of interdependence involved, the legitimacy of this fostering of conflict becomes increasingly questionable.
Despite the peculiarities of the case, involving a highly observable manifestation of connection rather than conflict, it was the perception of conflict that prevailed in the court's deliberations. This was fuelled most poignantly by the court in its discussion of Mary, the weaker twin, as an aggressor figure. Lord Justice Ward, for example, commented:
Mary . . . is alive because and only because, to put it bluntly, but nonetheless accurately, she sucks the lifeblood of Jodie and she sucks the lifeblood out of Jodie . . . Mary's parasitic living will be the cause of Jodie's ceasing to live. If Jodie could speak, she would surely protest, 'Stop it Mary, you are killing me'. Employment of emotive language of this kind lends further credence to the model of conflict already privileged by the prevailing adversarial court system. To be sure, this provides a possible interpretation of the relationship between the twins and of the nature of their interdependence. Indeed, this description of Mary as selfish parasite mirrors the epistemological premise underlying West's 'separation' thesis, which analogously experiences the foetus as an unwelcome intruder within the body of the pregnant woman. However, this is not the only available or viable interpretation of the conjoinment involved.
In automatically ascribing to the twins the assumptions of individualism and abstraction typically invoked within prevailing rights analysis, the court effectively privileged one interpretation of their relationship over another equally viable one. In thus privileging the separation thesis in this context, the court undermined the legitimacy of an alternative discourse based upon connection, support and interdependence. In positing Mary as an aggressive parasite sucking the lifeblood from her sister, the court arbitrarily prioritized the experience of self-interest and conflict over the equally experientially viable alternative of concern and connection.
While the assumption of conflict continues to satisfy the requirements of dominant rights strategies by presenting a legal articulation of the separatist agenda, it significantly undermines and disqualifies the aspects of connection and relationship also involved. In particular, it fails to take into account the potential bond, both physical and emotional, that may exist between the twins as siblings. When the significance of these connected aspects of the dilemma are accommodated within its legal representation, the ensuing complexities become more clearly observable and we can begin to re-evaluate the merits of presenting the twins as competing legal persons locked within a relationship of conflict.
SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 10(4)
It was not only in regard to the relationship between the twins, however, that the court prioritized this perception of conflict. Abstracting contextually significant factors from consideration, the judges' deliberation likewise encouraged the presumption of conflict between the twins and their parents. This remit of conflict was established despite a general consensus among the members of the panel that Jodie and Mary's parents were reasonable, loving and genuinely concerned for the welfare of their children. Indeed, it was established despite initial indications from the panel that the hospital would have been acting entirely lawfully had they proceeded on the basis of the parental wishes and decided against intervention ([2000] 4 All ER 961: 987) on the basis of the recognition that:
while there is now no rule of law that the rights and wishes of unimpeachable parents must prevail over other considerations, such rights and wishes, recognised as they are by nature and society, can be capable of ministering to the total welfare of the child in a special way and must therefore preponderate in many cases. ( J v. C [1969] 1 All ER 788: 824) Having thus established a foundation in favour of preserving the right of unimpeachable parents to determine the best interests of their children, however, the court proceeded to decide against the wishes of the twin's parents. The basis on which this qualification to their parental rights was justified lay in an alternative assessment of best interests undertaken on the court's behalf. Despite the panel's commendation of Dame Butler-Sloss's assertion in Re MB that best interests often extend beyond best medical interests ([1997] 2 FCR 541: 555), this alternative assessment continued to rely heavily upon medical prognoses. As a result, little concern was afforded to the other complex and relevant factors that necessarily impacted upon the exercise of their parental consent or dissent. Not only were the parents members of a strongly Roman Catholic community, they themselves subscribed to a belief system dependent upon the unquestioning validity of Catholic doctrine. Central to this belief system is the principle of the sanctity and equality of all human life and an attendant scepticism regarding heroic medical intervention.
By removing the power of decision from the twin's parents in this case despite concessions regarding their obvious love and concern for the welfare of their children, the Court undermined the parental rights it initially ascribed to them. What's more, it effectively established a conflict situation between the parents and the twins, by presenting the parental assessment of the best interests of their children as fundamentally flawed and as contrary to their legitimate welfare. In this sense, the twins became perceived as in need of protection from the misguided wishes of their parents. 6 In pitting the parental right to determine the welfare of their children against the interests of the twins thus evaluated, the court presented a conflict situation between the parents and children that undermined the strong connection between the parties involved.
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Having attributed full legal standing to each of the twins, the court proceeded to confer upon them the more duplicitous benefits of abstraction and individualism typically associated with the autonomous rights-bearer. As discussed above, the court thereby encouraged the adoption of a perception of conflict that presented fulfilment of one twin's individual interests as involving the performance of action prejudicial to the interests of the other twin.
Having done so, the difficulty for the court lay in determining how best to resolve this perceived conflict while maintaining requisite respect for the integrity and dignity of each twin as an independent and self-interested legal person. Lord Justice Ward, accepting that the first instance judge, Mr Justice Johnson, was wrong to seek to legitimate performance of the surgical separation on the grounds that it was in the best interests of both Jodie and Mary, conceded the limited persuasiveness of this argument in relation to the weaker twin. He recognized that under dominant rights analysis, the only benefit offered to Mary by the operation would lie in affording her the dignity of independent bodily integrity. However, he also recognized that this benefit was in fact illusory because she would be dead before she would have the opportunity to enjoy that independence ([2000] 4 All ER 961: 988-9). Developing that realization further he stated:
[the operation] is not in her [Mary's] best interests . . . It cannot be. It will bring her life to an end before it has run its natural span. It denies her inherent right to life. There is no countervailing advantage for her at all. It is contrary to her best interests. Looking at her position in isolation and ignoring, therefore, the benefit to Jodie, the court should not sanction the operation on her. ] 4 All ER 961: 1004 It is precisely this kind of analysis of the welfare of one individual in isolation from others that is fundamental to the framework of rights analysis within which the Court had implicitly located the issue of surgical separation and the relationship of conflict between the twins. Nonetheless, in their deliberation, the judges moved from an analysis based on the best interests of each twin individually towards an analysis based on their best interests as a combined unit. This covert shift in emphasis was illustrated clearly towards the end of Lord Justice Ward's judgment, where he stated:
The best interests of the twins is to give the chance of life to the child whose actual bodily condition is capable of accepting that chance to her advantage even if it has to be at the cost of the sacrifice of the life which is so unnaturally supported. (my emphasis) ([2000] In employing this balancing test, however, the Court effectively undermined its previous assertion that Mary, the weaker twin, had established full legal personhood and therefore enjoyed a right to life of equivalent standing to the right to life of her sister Jodie. Although the judges superficially sought to stand by that original assertion, their argument that despite having a right to life, Mary had no right to be alive ([2000] 4 All ER 961: 1010) because her life was effectively being maintained and supported by her stronger sister provides a highly puzzling paradox. What's more, it seems that the origins of this paradox lie in a judicial attempt to legitimate a highly qualitative and consequential decision under the guise of clever terminology.
The ordinary understanding of the right to life would surely encompass a right to be alive such that Mary and Jodie continue to enjoy the right to the same level of legal protection. While Lord Justice Ward, aware of the significant ramifications of a conclusion that effectively prioritized Jodie's right to life over Mary's, employed linguistic trickery to invoke a distinction without a difference, evidence given by surgical teams, approved of by the panel, betrayed the reality of the situation more vividly. Citing the statements of one of the consultant surgeons involved in the twin's clinical care, Lord Justice Ward commended his argument that:
We could only look at taking it [the act of 'killing off' Mary, to use the doctor's terminology] on if we felt that there was really and truly in the best interests, taking the whole situation as it is, of Jodie, and if Mary's long-term survival was so poor that it was not really a sensible proposition. (my emphasis) ([2000] 4 All ER 961: 982) Seeking to justify this approach by phrasing it in terms of ensuring the 'lesser of two evils' fails to disguise the fact that this balancing test finds its roots firmly within the framework of consequential utilitarian analysis. This implicit move from deontology to utilitarianism in the court's deliberation attests strongly to the growing scepticism, discussed in the previous section, regarding the ability of dominant rights analysis to deal with contexts within which competing rights cannot be simplistically attributed to bounded and autonomous entities. Armed with ideology which conceives of the legal person as radically autonomous, disinterested and self-referential, prevailing rights analysis is ill-equipped to deal with the complexities of the situation of conjoined twins. It simply does not have the requisite frameworks within which to fence such experiences of connection nor to render them intelligible.
Where the language and institutions of rights are faced with such incontrovertible disjunction, as has been the case with Jodie and Mary, the law effectively shifts its ethical parameters towards a more utilitarian ethic while maintaining some superficial allegiance to the rhetoric of rights discourse.
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND BOUNDED CONFINES
This kind of move towards utilitarian analysis has generally been resisted in cases such as organ and bone marrow donation, where a distinct entity can be identified to accompany the autonomous legal persona. In the US case of McFall v. Shimp for example, it was decided that, despite the close interpersonal relationship involved, family members could not be compelled to benefit one another's health when to do so would be to their own detriment. So strong was the judicial reluctance against invoking a utilitarian agenda in this case that the court stated that it would change the very principles upon which our liberal society is founded to compel one person to submit to an intrusion upon their body for the benefit of another.
However, the Court of Appeal in the case of Re A considered it less of a legal and ethical leap to intrude forcibly upon the body of one conjoined twin, and to thereby bring about the death of that twin, in the interests of preserving the life of another. Pursuing the assumptions of dominant rights analysis to their logical conclusions prohibits the possibility of this kind of consequentially motivated invasion. Despite the Court's averred ascription of full and independent legal status to both Jodie and Mary, however, the Court has provided an exemption from the general deontological prescription that was deemed so central to liberal legal and ethical sensibilities in the case of the non-conjoined rights-bearers in McFall v. Shimp.
This begs the question of what distinguishes the case of Jodie and Mary from that of the familial bone marrow donor in McFall v. Shimp? If we concede to the court the legitimacy of their analysis, both cases sought to determine the legality of compelling one person to undergo invasive and risky surgical procedures in order to preserve the right to life of another. What's more, both cases involved the determination of such claims in contexts of preexisting and intimate relationship and connection. Nonetheless, in the case of the adult rights-bearer, enforced intervention was firmly condemned, while in the case of Jodie and Mary, where the element of risk involved for Mary was substantially higher, intervention was authorized by the court.
There are of course certain material facts that distinguish the case of Re A from that of McFall v. Shimp. Perhaps the most important of them relates to the peculiar nature of the embodiment involved. In the latter case, despite the significance of the relationship between the parties, the identification of separate legal entities with distinct boundaries and bodily confines remained possible. The observable containment of each legal agent within his/her bodily confines thereby enabled a vivid depiction of the brutality of nonconsensual invasion for the good of the other. By contrast, in the case of Jodie 470
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and Mary, despite the assumption of independent legal personas, the conceptual ability to identify bounded and embodied selves was compromised. The court was constrained by inherent ambiguities in the delineation of 'mine' and 'thine' and was therefore unable to locate the independent and self-serving rights it implicitly attributed to each of the twins within distinct bodily boundaries. In turn, this rendered the invasiveness of the proposed procedure less violent, and less intrusive, 7 promoting a permissive environment in which to re-assess the beneficial consequences of the operation. Attributing ethical and legal significance to the fact of shared skin or bodily boundaries seems fundamentally misguided and contrary to the liberal spirit of equality to all legal persons. Nonetheless, commentators have increasingly come to question the ability of the dominant notion of the legal subject to cater for agents with non-distinct boundaries of embodiment (Naffine, 1998) . To be sure, this differentiating factor provides a convincing explanation for the diametrically opposed responses manifest in the two cases of McFall v. Shimp and Re A.
A POTENTIAL AUTHORITY FOR UTILITARIANISM?
By highlighting the symbolic significance attributed to distinct bodily boundaries within dominant rights analysis, the above argument provides a potential explanation for the slip from deontology to utilitarianism manifest in the case of Re A. However, the decision in the UK case of Re Y appears to provide some authority for this utilitarian analysis in instances involving separate and bounded legal persons. In this case, the court was faced with determining whether or not it would be legal to compel an incompetent woman to undergo a harvesting procedure to abstract sections of her bone marrow which would then be donated to her terminally ill sibling. Upon examining the specific facts of the case, Justice Connell declared that it would be lawful in this instance to compel the defendant to undergo this procedure.
At first sight, this decision may appear to provide support for the enforced invasion of one bounded legal person to benefit another. Upon a closer inspection of the court's reasoning, however, it becomes apparent that Justice Connell's conclusion, unlike the conclusion in Re A, was not in fact justified on the basis of any kind of utilitarian analysis. On the contrary, where the reasoning invoked in Re A and condemned in McFall v. Shimp examined the legitimacy of enforcing a procedure upon a non-consenting person for the benefit of another, the reasoning in Re Y retained its focus upon the best interests of the proposed donor.
While compelling her to undergo the procedure, Justice Connell did not legitimize that determination on the basis of a utilitarian agenda, but rather on the basis of an examination of the rights and interests of the defendant broadly defined. Serious attention was paid to the context within which the decision had to be made and to the closeness of the family bond between the siblings. In particular, emphasis was placed upon the likely impact of the MUNRO: CONJOINED TWINS AND RIGHTS 471 death of the sibling upon the defendant, not only at the emotional level, but also at the pragmatic level in terms of its necessitating a dramatic reduction in the defendant's contact with her mother. While it has been suggested above that the court in Re A undermined the legitimacy of their rights-based bestinterests rhetoric through the invocation of consequentialist analysis, in the case of Re Y, Justice Connell's reasoning complied with the court's initial statement that:
The test to be applied in a case such as this is to ask whether the evidence shows that it is in the best interests of the defendant for such procedures to take place.
The fact that such a process would obviously benefit the plaintiff is not relevant unless, as a result of the defendant helping the plaintiff in that way, the best interests of the defendant are served. ([1997] 2 WLR 556: 559) Rather than authorizing the procedure on the basis of the overall good consequences to be achieved in terms of the minimal risk posed to the defendant as opposed to the considerable benefit offered to her sibling, the court in Re Y maintained this test throughout. In the final analysis, performance was authorised on the basis of a committed and informed belief that acting as a donor to her sister, in permitting continuation of her positive relationship with her mother, would be 'to the emotional, psychological and social benefit of the defendant' ([1997] 2 WLR 556: 562).
By thus basing its analysis on interests broadly defined, the court in Re Y successfully enabled resolution of a complex legal and ethical dilemma, not in itself easily reducible to abstract and individualist rights analysis. In so doing, furthermore, it successfully resisted the temptation, manifest in the panel's deliberation in Re A, to invoke a utilitarian agenda to encourage resolution.
A COMPARABLE CONTEXT: MATERNAL-FOETAL RELATIONS
Maternal-foetal relations represent another relational context characterized by ambiguous bodily boundaries within which the law's attempt to superimpose the highly abstract and individualist framework of rights analysis has proven manifestly inadequate. Commentators in this area have expressed concern not only regarding the legal tendency to conceive of mother and foetus as separate entities but also regarding the accompanying tendency to conceive of the relationship between them as one of conflict (Gallagher, 1987 and Johnsen, 1986) . For many such commentators, it is far from coincidental that, in the case of both conjoined twins and maternal-foetal relations, a significant amount of legal deference has been afforded to the legitimacy of the clinical perception of distinct patients with competing medical needs (Rhoden, 1986 and Annas, 1987) . As Diduck explains:
the dominant construction of pregnancy, assisted by medical technology which allows us to see and photograph the foetus without seeing the woman of whom 472
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it is a part, combined with a discourse of rights which celebrates the individual and his boundaries from other individuals thus form the framework within which foetal protection arguments are made. (1993: 471) The increasing emergence of these foetal protection arguments has forcefully presented the pregnancy experience as one involving two separate entities with potentially hostile interests. Despite the rhetoric of this legal model of separation, however, the biological reality remains that the foetus is completely dependent upon the body of the pregnant woman for healthy development. In this sense, the legal ascription of an environment of conflict may be contra-indicated by the experiential context. Developing this point further, Mair (1996) argues that this conflict is itself often largely constructed by dominant legal discourse and by the individualism of rights analysis.
As in the case of the conjoined twins Jodie and Mary, legal authority has superimposed a highly abstract and individualist rights framework onto the embodied pregnancy experience, instead of taking the opportunity presented by this potential anomaly to question the assumptions of the overall context of rights-attribution. While the abstract liberal model and its rigid characterisation of the nature of legal rights may be representative of the pregnancy experience for many women, for many others, it presents a counter-intuitive agenda of abstraction, individualism and conflict that is particularly ill-suited to their experiential narratives of connection and care.
Having adopted this form of rights-analysis, however, the problem for the courts once again becomes one of achieving satisfactory resolution where the preservation of the rights of one necessarily requires the infringement of the rights of the other. When a pregnant woman refuses consent to a caesarean section operation, for example, the court is faced with a perceived conflict. This conflict extends not only to a question of the foetal right to life versus the maternal right to autonomy, but also to protecting the maternal right to life against the imposition of a surgical technique that carries with it substantial medical risks, even of death. Once again, therefore, the courts may ultimately be faced with determining whose right to life is to prevail. It was noted in the previous section that, despite the disclaimers manifest in adjudicative legal rhetoric, courts involved in these arenas often resolve this perceived conflict not through an analysis and evaluation of rights, but through a resort to utilitarian calculus.
In one of the earliest decisions on the issue of enforced caesarean section, Re S, the court applied a method of logic heavily reminiscent of that employed by the court in its judgment in Re A. In a lamentably short judgment, the court in Re S authorized the imposition of a caesarean section operation upon a competent, non-consenting maternal patient on the basis of an analysis of 'best interests'. Despite strong judicial authority affirming the right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment upon any grounds, regardless of the consequence upon their health or interests (Re T), the court authorized imposition of the invasive and risky procedure upon the maternal patient. What's more, it did so without any detailed deliberation on those MUNRO: CONJOINED TWINS AND RIGHTS 473 best interests, and without any clear indication as to whose best interests were at issue. In the wake of Re S, there was considerable condemnation of the decision. Indeed recent authorities have challenged its legitimacy and have asserted the right of the maternal patient to have her autonomy and bodily integrity respected regardless of the interests and potentially determinable rights of the foetus (Re MB and St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v. S). Importantly, however, these latter judgments have tended to manifest themselves only upon appeal. Typically, in appeal cases, the issue transcends the complexities of unascertainable bodily boundaries manifest in the first instance hearing and shared with the context of conjoined twins. The decision to enforce surgery having already been taken and the procedure having been performed, the party appears before the court once more as a separate and distinct legal person existing within a separate and bounded bodily confine. The court is therefore far better able to apply its dominant, separatist rights agenda to condemn the first instance decision that permitted the forceful and invasive intrusion upon one person's bodily integrity to benefit another.
Many commentators have drawn attention to the largely ineffectual operation of the doctrine of precedent in the context of maternal-foetal conflict (Annas, 1987 and Rhoden, 1986) . The symbolic importance of bodily boundaries within rights discourse provides a powerful explanation of this phenomenon. Regardless of appellate-level precedent, when the issues involved emerge within the first instance setting, the court continues to be confronted with a vivid illustration of an embodiment beyond immediate classification within an individualist rights-based analysis. The difficulties inherent in determining boundaries, and the attendant dilution of the invasiveness of the procedures proposed continue to permit the enforcement of surgery.
The slip from deontology exhibited in these judgments has existed as an anomaly within modern legal culture for quite some time, flying in the face of various authorities advocating an absolute right to refuse medical treatment and an absolute denouncement of treating people as means rather than as ends. With the advent of the judgment in the case of Jodie and Mary, it appears that we have found another arena within which the law may entertain a utilitarian calculus in the balancing of competing rights. In the opinion of the author, it is no accident that this arises within a context where there are similar complexities of connection and embodiment involved that visibly challenge the presuppositions of the dominant rights analysis.
A PROPOSAL FOR RE-EVALUATION
In the previous sections, we have examined the potential difficulties attributable to the characteristic privileging of separation over connection inherent in dominant rights analysis. In particular, we have examined its shortcomings in contexts within which the identification of abstract and 474
SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 10(4)
individual legal subjects is problematic. Citing the contexts of conjoined twins and pregnancy, furthermore, we have examined the extent to which dominant rights analysis is fundamentally ill-equipped to deal adequately with rights-bearers whose peculiar confines of embodiment are incompatible with the bounded and self-containing ideal.
Recognizing the aforementioned shortcomings of prevailing rights analysis does not, however, render the very notion of rights necessarily problematic. The significant strides towards equality, tolerance and liberty that have been afforded by reliance upon specific rights manifestos have been noted above, as has the continued rhetorical and symbolic relevance of rights discourse. As Bridgeman and Millns comment, 'it is almost as hard to be against rights as it is to be against virtue ' (1998: 27) . The difficulties presented by the application of rights in prevailing analysis stem, therefore, less from an inadequacy inherent in rights-based claims than from the assumptions that underlie their form and operation in current liberal discourse. While challenging the manner in which current rights discourse tends to be presented as absolute, individual and independent of any necessary relation to responsibility, we must also recognize, therefore, that this presentation is in itself only one among many in law's engagement with the notion of rights.
The central problem with dominant rights-based frameworks is not that they are inherently limiting but that they have operated within a limited institutional and imaginative arena (Fraser, 1989) . As Minow comments, 'rights rhetoric bears traditional meanings, but it is capable of carrying new meanings ' (1987: 1860) . This section will begin to illuminate the potential for a reconfiguration of rights analysis to accommodate a more relational, cooperative and concrete application.
RELATIONAL RIGHTS AND DOMINANT ASSUMPTIONS
Instances such as conjoined twins and pregnancy, within which the legitimacy of the separatist agenda is confounded by conceptual ambiguities in determining ascertainable boundaries between one rights-bearer and another, provide a vivid illustration of the potential difficulties involved in the uncritical assumption of individualistic and abstract rights analysis. The failure to achieve resolution in these contexts via a separatist agenda motivated by the ideology of conflict and win/lose dichotomies results in a judicial tendency to betray the rhetoric of rights through the invocation of utilitarian analysis.
While recognizing that it may sometimes be empowering for legal agents to be able to transcend context and relationship in order to assert autonomous self-interest, contemporary theorists have highlighted the extent to which the automatic assumption of separation manifest in dominant rights analysis may likewise promote disempowerment. Such theorists have sought to supplement dominant interpretations of legal rights with a more relational and flexible interpretation (MacKenzie and Stoljar, 2000) . This alternative conception of legal rights accommodates the connection experience alongside MUNRO: CONJOINED TWINS AND RIGHTS 475 the separation experience and provides a standard for protection that, in transcending the necessity of conflict, is more amenable to attribution to associated legal agents. While maintaining an appropriate reverence for interests already prioritized by dominant rights analysis, this relational approach permits recognition of contextual interests that cannot be adequately located within specific confines of embodiment and cannot be adequately characterized within the prevailing self-serving framework. By affording credence within the legal arena to narratives of connection and co-operation alongside narratives of separation and conflict, this relational approach recognizes the extent to which rights-based claims are embedded within, and can scarcely be abstracted from, the contexts and relationships within which they arise.
In the specific case of maternal-foetal relations, this relational interpretation of rights has already been well received (De Gama, 1993 and Seymour, 2000) . Many commentators have welcomed the promise of this approach in terms of its capacity to highlight the unique potential for connection within the pregnancy experience, and its attendant incompatibility with the individualist emphasis on rights and the prevailing model of conflict it encourages. Its application in the context of pregnancy permits the development of a middle ground, often disguised within the rhetoric of individual legal rights, between perceiving of the foetus as merely a part of the pregnant woman and perceiving of the foetus as a separate entity with potentially hostile interests.
This 'not-one-but-not-two' approach (Karpin, 1992 ) presents a pragmatic alternative to the egocentric attribution implicit in prevailing rights discourse. Not only does it discourage the problematic legal tendency to seek arbitrary divisions between the body of one and the body of another in all contexts, it also challenges the dominant conception that rights can only be attached to a concrete, distinct and radically autonomous entity. While applying the separate entities model and its accompanying perception of abstract and individualist legal rights presents scope for a massive arena of conflict, presenting a more relational model of rights absolves the inevitability of the win/lose dichotomy.
By thus re-configuring rights into a more relational framework, courts dealing with the specific context of conjoined twins would likewise be better equipped to identify a similar middle ground itself disguised by reliance upon the prevailing assumptions of rights discourse. This middle ground offers an alternative to the oscillation, manifest most clearly by Lord Justice Ward in the case of Re A, between representing the twins as entirely distinct and autonomous, and representing them as a combined entity, whose interests could be determined on the basis of consequential analysis.
Invoking this relational approach enables a crucial recognition of the connection, both emotional and physical, between the twins and dissolves the legitimacy of the assumption of conflict between them. Without denying the gravity of the individual interests that remain attributable to each twin, application of the relational approach challenges the assumption that rights are exclusively invoked to protect self-serving interests and draws attention to the existence of certain contextual interests not sufficiently recognized within
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SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 10(4) the prevailing abstract model. In so doing, it not only broadens the spectrum of relevant concerns in measuring and quantifying rights but also encourages a more comprehensive and grounded determination of 'best interests' to include relevant social and psychological factors currently excluded from legal assessment. Ultimately, this promotes recognition of the arbitrariness of prevailing concepts of legal subjectivity and commensurate virtues as entailing radical individualism and self-preservation. Numerous commentators have noted the merits of this relational approach in a variety of arenas other than those complicated by shared bodily boundaries. In contexts ranging from female genital mutilation (Stychin, 1998) to genetic decision making (Donchin, 2000) , for example, its application has provided a welcome opportunity to redress the tension between separation and connection inherent in law. While in many contexts the separatist agenda inherent in dominant rights analysis may still prevail, the incorporation of relational rights permits the development of a broader category of rightsbearers engaging with a broader spectrum of relevant interests on the basis of which to formulate rights-based claims. In turn, this relational approach permits an attendant privileging of connection, context and interdependence in law to reflect the dialectic epistemological realities of social living.
RELATIONAL RIGHTS AND CONSEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS
It has been suggested above that the relational approach boasts significant benefits in terms of its ability to transcend the characteristic dangers associated with the assumptions of separation, abstraction and conflict implicated in prevailing rights analysis. Despite its more co-operative and contextual emphasis, however, it must be conceded that this relational approach continues to depend on a reminiscent conception of an identifiable holder of specific interests in need of protection from impinging dictates of the common good.
When taken to extremes, this conception can indeed promote those dangerous assumptions in response to which the relational approach offers a counter. Nonetheless, retention of this conception is necessary in order to protect the relational rights-bearer from the utilitarian impulse. By enabling continued centrality to be accorded to the rights-bearer in question without asserting imperatives of abstraction and separation, the relational approach protects personal dignity and integrity against imperatives of the greatest social good.
The relational approach can, therefore, be contrasted equally strongly against the utilitarian approach as against the dominant rights-based approach discussed above. Where resolution on the basis of utilitarian agendas demands their sacrifice to the satisfaction of the common good, invocation of relational analysis denies the possibility of disrespecting the rightsbearers involved. What's more, while utilitarian agendas involve examination of public policy concerns and dictate resolution on the basis of the priority accorded to certain values and persons by society at large, relational analysis MUNRO: CONJOINED TWINS AND RIGHTS 477 remains exclusively concerned with examination of issues relevant to those directly involved. Where a relational conception of rights operates alongside the dominant conception of an identifiable rights-bearer, this does not reduce the importance of rights nor sacrifice them to the common good. Nonetheless, recognition of interdependence in relationships does promote its acceptance and thereby challenges the assumption implicit in the prevailing individualist analysis that dependence equates with weakness and potentially incomplete legal personhood.
IMPLICATIONS FOR RE A
In contexts ill-suited to the separation thesis reified in the dominant approach to rights analysis, there are many advantages offered by the invocation of a relational approach. In particular, as we have seen above, the relational approach successfully dissolves the inevitability of the problematic win-lose dichotomy through a more complex, contextual and flexible approach to the assessment and operation of rights-based claims.
In the specific case of Re A invocation of such a relational approach would potentially have promoted a variety of arguments, other than those offered by reliance upon prevailing assumptions. First, it would have permitted consideration within the legal arena of interests and concerns previously excluded, such as the centrality of religious belief systems to the community within which a child may be raised. Secondly, it would have permitted a reevaluation of the legitimacy of perceiving Mary as a selfish parasite sucking the life out of her sister by presenting an antithetical characterization of their relationship as one involving connection and mutual support. Thirdly, in providing an alternative to the dominant ideal of the embodied, abstract and autonomous legal agent, it would have permitted a more flexible approach to the identification of non-distinct rights-bearers whose interests could not be located strictly within the confines of bounded parameters of embodiment.
By thus presenting an alternative assessment and depiction of the context in Re A, the invocation of relational analysis would of course risk augmenting rather than diminishing the complexity of the dilemma confronting the Court of Appeal. Nonetheless, it can barely be disputed that affording legal credence to the connection thesis alongside the separation thesis would have presented a more comprehensive reflection of the realities of the dilemma from the experiential perspective of the legal agents involved. What's more, by providing a more honest analysis of the relevance of relationship and context, without thereby surrendering the legal person to the dictates of the common good, invocation of the relational approach would have provided a contrast against the motivations of the utilitarian agenda.
Ultimately, in the case of Re A, invocation of relational rights analysis may still have resulted in a determination in favour of enforced separation. In particular, it may have promoted this conclusion by permitting the attribution 478
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to Mary of an interest, located in the closeness of her relationship to Jodie and in the inevitability of her own death, in ensuring the continuation of her sister's life. Any such conclusion would, however, be dependent upon a continued respect for the dignity and integrity of both twins as bearers of full legal personhood in a specific relational context and on an evaluation of their best interests in this light. It can, therefore, be clearly distinguished from the deliberation based on utilitarian calculus and assessments of the greater good that informed the Court of Appeal's original analysis. The original judgment in the case of Re A, implying that rights discourse itself was inherently incapable of accommodating relational concerns, sought to legitimate its utilitarian impulse through a veiled discussion of 'combined best interests'. In challenging the notion that rights discourse cannot be reconciled with the connection thesis, the relational approach questions the need for a resort to utilitarianism and highlights the illegitimacy of this covert slip from rights analysis (however defined and delineated) to consequential resolution. While the scepticism expressed within this article regarding the merits of utilitarian analysis has been, and will no doubt continue to be challenged, the fact that this shift from deontology to utilitarianism has a significant impact upon our medical and legal imperatives can barely be disputed. What is equally defensible on that basis is the claim that any introduction of utilitarian analysis must not be incorporated covertly disguised underneath the rhetoric of rights as it has been in the context of Re A.
CONCLUSION
The specific context of conjoined twins discussed within this article illustrates one of many legal quandries that could be drawn upon to illustrate the deficient assumptions that dominate liberal rights analysis. It is particularly relevant, however, not only because of its emotive impact, but also because of the ability of its embodied context to provide a highly observable manifestation of the potentially problematic individualism inherent in rights. What's more, it also represents one of the most dramatic legal decisions to date which, despite its rhetoric of rights, has implicitly accepted a utilitarian position in permitting the sacrifice of Mary to ensure the survival of Jodie. The fact that courts have been unwilling to accept such utilitarian imperatives in other areas where a distinct legal agent can be identified merely attests to the inability of the current rights model to offer sufficient protection to the parties involved where separation is less observable.
The emerging model of relational rights discussed in the preceding section boasts a variety of virtues, among the most important of which is the virtue of flexibility. While recognizing the existence and value of each rights-bearer, it denies the dominant temptation to assert the necessity of their radical separation. In turn therefore it renders unnecessary the assumption that contexts within which this embodied separation is impossible (such as conjoined twins and pregnancy) involve a conflict between two competing entities and their MUNRO: CONJOINED TWINS AND RIGHTS 479
